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Science can be part of an effective investigative response to
a bioterrorism event or a biocrime by providing capabilities to
analyze biological and associated signatures in collected evi-
dence. Microbial forensics, a discipline comprised of several
scientific fields, is dedicated to the analysis of evidence from
such criminal acts to help determine the responsible party and
to exonerate the innocent (6). A partnership among a number
of government agencies, academia, and the private sector has
been formed to better respond to and deter potential perpe-
trators of bioterrorism or biocrimes. This partnership leverages
our national scientific and analytical capabilities to support
activities of law enforcement agencies.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose mis-
sion is, in part, to respond to and to prevent acts of terrorism
against the United States, has established the National Biofo-
rensics Analysis Center (NBFAC) (4, 6). The NBFAC, in part-
nership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), (i)
provides a state-of-the-art central laboratory for analysis of
microbial forensic evidence and (ii) serves as a nexus for inte-
grating the national resources to increase the effectiveness of
law enforcement in obtaining the highest level of attribution
possible in criminal cases where the weapon is a biological
agent.
One approach used by the NBFAC to establish a sound
foundation, to foster communication, and to facilitate integra-
tion across government and other agencies is to promote in-
dependent meetings, which address specific needs and provide
a forum for input from the broader scientific community, on
the best scientific practices in microbial forensics (5). As part
of this ongoing effort, a series of meetings sponsored by DHS
were held at the Banbury Center of the Cold Spring Harbor
Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY, to address specific issues
for the enhancement of microbial forensic capability. One such
meeting, held on 16 to 19 October 2005, focused on the col-
lection, handling, and storage of samples. These issues had
been identified at previous meetings (5, 6) as some of the most
critical issues confronting a crime scene investigation and sub-
sequent analysis of evidence. The participants represented di-
verse scientific entities within academia, the private sector, the
national laboratories, and several federal agencies (Central
Intelligence Agency, Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, DHS, FBI, Food and Drug Administration, and U.S.
Department of Agriculture), some of which have been involved
in evidence collection for purposes related to forensics, public
health, or plant and animal health.
The collection and preservation of microbial forensic evi-
dence are paramount to efficient and successful investigation
and attribution. If evidence (when available) is not collected,
degrades, or is contaminated during collection, handling, trans-
port, or storage, the downstream characterization and attribu-
tion analyses may be compromised. Retrieving sufficient quan-
tities and maintaining the integrity of the evidence increase the
chances of being able to characterize the material to obtain the
highest level of attribution possible. This paper presents issues
related to the practices of sample collection, handling, trans-
portation, and storage and includes recommendations for fu-
ture directions for the field of microbial forensics and people
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participating in it. The recommendations apply to the NBFAC,
as well as to other facilities and practitioners.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
A terrorist event involving a biological agent can be either
overt or covert. When it is overt, law enforcement (i.e., the
FBI, which has the lead investigative role by authority) controls
the investigation and works closely with public health author-
ities as appropriate. If it is covert, law enforcement may not be
involved immediately. In some cases, the lag time for law
enforcement involvement may be substantial. As is true for any
crime investigation, this lag time could hamper opportunities
to collect meaningful evidence. In either situation, there are
many plausible crime scene investigative scenarios, ranging
from searching a clandestine laboratory to identifying and con-
taining a canister found in a subway.
The response to a biocrime or bioterrorist event can be
divided into the activities carried out by first responders and
the activities performed by hazardous material crime scene
investigators. First responders may include health care work-
ers, firefighters, police, paramedics, hazardous material per-
sonnel, veterinarians, or even concerned citizens. In a covert
attack, some of the evidence, such as medical histories, clinical
samples, and tissue samples collected by an attending physi-
cian, a medical examiner, or coroner, is likely to be collected
prior to law enforcement involvement (33). Crime scene inves-
tigators usually follow first responders or a surveillance team
that has gathered some preliminary information about the
event. Thus, investigators who arrive to collect forensic evi-
dence likely already have some prior knowledge about the
crime scene. This knowledge should be used during the pre-
operational planning phase of a crime scene investigation, but
it should not be used alone. Planning is requisite. For most
bioterrorism cases, a detailed operational plan describing a
strategy for the initial sampling, collection, and transport of
evidence should be developed. The plan usually involves a
focused search and collection process based on reasonable
assumptions about the event. Preparatory work is essential
because of the hazardous, chaotic, or even life-threatening
environment presented to crime scene investigators. Investiga-
tors may have to wear personal protective equipment (PPE)
(1) that limits mobility, the time available to work at the scene,
and flexibility. Thus, crime scene investigators should plan,
organize, and anticipate practices that facilitate the collection
and handling of microbial forensic evidence on a timely and
sometimes time-constrained basis.
The goal of a hazardous material crime scene investigator is
to obtain sufficient biological agent and associated materials,
when available, to support a meaningful analytical investiga-
tion for species and strain (and substrain) identification or for
toxin identification. The biological agent itself, however, is not
the only forensic evidence to consider. Related chemical and
physical signatures, including by-products, and traditional fo-
rensic evidence, such as fingerprints, computer records, and
trace evidence, can provide clues to the identity of the individ-
ual(s) who committed the crime. Where to sample, the method
of sampling, and how many samples to collect are important
considerations to obtain the right type, quantity, and quality
of data to support attribution. Furthermore, it is essential to
maintain the integrity of the evidence, to the extent possible,
from the time of collection and during subsequent storage;
otherwise, crucial and reliable forensic information can be lost.
Traditional basic crime scene investigation strategies apply
to cases of bioterrorism or biocrimes (39). The first priorities
are the care of victims (33) and the potential public health
risks. The next priority is securing the crime scene. The event
or suspected event may involve more than one scene, and
determination of a scene and its extent may be difficult. Then
coordination discussions should be held, in which law enforce-
ment, public (or agricultural) health, and Environmental Pro-
tection Agency officials discuss their roles and capabilities in
dealing with a biological attack, whether it is overt or covert.
These discussions should include the best methods for the
collection and handling of evidence, collection of specimens to
assess the level of contamination in order to guide public
health (or agricultural) investigations and restoration and re-
covery activities, and the proper PPE to use. Restoration and
recovery activities to mitigate public health concerns (e.g., de-
contamination of facilities) should not occur until forensic
evidence is collected for law enforcement purposes.
SAMPLE COLLECTION
The inherent rigidity in a standard operating protocol (SOP)
for crime scene processing could be unwieldy and impractical
in a bioterrorism event or biocrime, possibly even compromis-
ing evidence collection in some cases. Therefore, consultation
among the different entities involved in a response should
provide best-practice options framed on established guidelines
(45). The plan can be modified after greater scrutiny of the
crime scene or as more information is obtained during the
course of the investigation.
The participants emphasized that it is not possible or even
desirable to prepare a single, defined SOP (or even a number
of them) to process the many possible crime scenes that may be
encountered. However, lack of a specific SOP should not pre-
clude attempts to collect critical evidence. If the forensic situ-
ation fits a pattern or template for which a sample collection
methodology and/or sampling strategy already has been vali-
dated, then the sampling activities could be well-defined and
more focused. However, in most microbial forensic cases, the
sampling area, location, type of agent, substrates, and combi-
nations of these variables are almost always novel. This may be
particularly true for trace evidence. Indeed, some flexibility in
the sampling processes must be allowed, because every crime
scene is different and the variability of the presentation of
microbiological evidence can be immense. Moreover, the sam-
pling requirements for microbes or DNA evidence are likely to
be completely different than those for different toxins.
Perhaps the best and most widely accepted approach for
development of a sampling strategy in a particular case is to
follow established guiding principles (for crime scene investi-
gations) in combination with expert knowledge, including mi-
crobiological and biochemical knowledge, investigative experi-
ence, and common sense. Even without a prescribed sampling
tool or methodology, sometimes innovation or intuitive means
may be necessary as it is preferable to attempt to collect evi-
dence rather than to ignore the evidence altogether. The op-
erational sample collection strategy should accommodate the
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uncertainty about the evidence being collected. However,
when a novel or modified approach is used, all steps and the
information accrued must be well documented for future ref-
erence and scrutiny.
The agencies involved in the investigation of buildings po-
tentially contaminated with anthrax spores via the mail (38)
determined that the best chance of recovering evidence for
forensic analysis (as well as for determining an initial public
health risk) was to focus on areas likely to be exposed to spores
(36). A targeted sampling strategy is the appropriate approach
and should be considered first when a biological agent is sus-
pected or when information on the source of a potential biolog-
ical agent is available. The targeted approach should not be con-
fused with remediation sampling strategies, which are different
than the sampling strategies used for crime scene investigations
(see the discussion about the Government Accountability Office
[GAO] report below). A defined approach allows maximum suc-
cess in retrieving evidence, especially when the conditions for
collection are hazardous or time constrained, as well as utilization
of limited resources as effectively as possible.
Evidence may be collected by three general approaches.
One approach is to collect the whole item and transport it to a
properly dedicated biocontainment facility, previously shown
to be free of contaminating biothreat agent signatures, for
further sampling and analysis. This approach minimizes the
time required for evidence collection, which is important when
investigators are wearing PPE. Makeshift certified facilities
may be designated for very large pieces of evidence, and the
NBFAC facility may be used to accommodate smaller pieces of
evidence. Once evidence is transferred to a secure location,
more vigorous evaluation and detailed sampling can be con-
ducted in a controlled environment under appropriate biocon-
tainment conditions. However, some items may be too large or
too bulky to be removed from the crime scene, the items may
not be accommodated in a controlled laboratory setting, or
there may be some concern about loss of trace evidence during
transport. When the whole item cannot be recovered, an in-
vestigator can remove a portion of the item (this approach
includes vacuuming, filtration, and/or water sample collection).
Lastly, an approach that is particularly useful for collecting
trace materials is swabbing or wiping materials or surfaces with
appropriate sample collection devices.
Sample collection devices include dry swabs, premoistened
swabs, wipes, high-efficiency particulate air vacuums and fil-
ters, and aspirating needles (7–9, 21, 31). Substantial experience
exists within various government agencies, clinical microbiology,
the Laboratory Response Network (19), and veterinary and ag-
riculture practices (7, 12, 21, 35, 46) for guidance concerning
the approach to use in a given situation. However, there are
three major concerns regarding the use of sampling methods
and collection devices. First, some of the methods and sam-
pling devices have not been rigorously validated. It is not
known which method and device yield the best collection effi-
ciency or provide the best recovery of physical, chemical,
and/or biological signatures. In some cases, sufficient material
may not be available for sampling during an investigation even
though adequate material may have been present at the crime
scene. The assumptions made by crime scene investigators are
more limited if the efficiency of the collection method is un-
known. Second, a number of methods have been validated, but
current security restrictions may hinder sharing the validation
data between agencies. Thus, data on best practices, as well as
data on practices that do not perform well, may exist but are
not available to all workers who need them. Third, one should
have a general understanding of the analyte or target signature
that will be analyzed, and the collection method should be
tailored appropriately. This is not an easy task for microbial
forensics practitioners because of the uncertainty associated
with each case, the diversity of bacteria, fungi, viruses, and
toxins, and the stability of analytes, such as nucleic acids or
proteins. What may be reasonable for collecting one microor-
ganism might be deleterious for another (33). Also, what may
solubilize one toxin may be ineffectual for recovering another
toxin (35). Even differences in the background matrix carrying
the evidence material may warrant changes in the sampling
strategy. Thus, in some scenarios it might be good practice to
collect multiple samples and use several different preservation
modalities to accommodate different analytical schemes (see
recommendations below for a strategy to begin to address the
major concerns for sampling).
The methods and devices for evidence collection must be
validated with regard to subsequent analytical processes. Con-
sider a scenario in which a crime scene investigator uses a swab
with a 15-cm diameter to collect evidence over large surface
areas. Although validation testing shows that such a swab is
effective for collecting microorganisms, most if not all diagnos-
tic and analytical laboratories cannot accommodate such a
large swab for sample processing (e.g., extraction of nucleic
acids). This exaggerated example stresses the point that vali-
dation should be designed with consideration of the entire
process from collection to analysis. Other examples to consider
for DNA-based analyses are chemicals inherent in the swab
material that copurify with DNA and/or environmental impu-
rities such as metal ions or organic compounds that may pref-
erentially bind to the swab during collection and may inhibit
the PCR. Alternatively, swabs may contain soluble components
that may be either cytotoxic for cell culture systems used to
recover viruses or inhibitory for the growth of certain bacteria
in culture.
Some materials designed to preserve a particular pathogen
may impact negatively on the analytical assay. In the clinical
laboratory, specimens containing bacteria tend to be delivered
in general transport media (e.g., Amies or Stuarts) that contain
some nutrients to maintain viability. Viral transport media
usually consist of solutions such as phosphate-buffered sucrose
or Hanks balanced salt solution with bovine serum albumin
and some antibiotics to retard bacterial growth. Many com-
mercial PCR or antigen detection kits provide proprietary
transport media that have been designed to stabilize the ana-
lyte in question. There also are some general transport solu-
tions for collection of samples for PCR analysis that lyse the
bacteria or viruses and stabilize the nucleic acids (13, 18, 29).
The media generally used to collect and transport animal
pathogens also were developed primarily to preserve proteins,
nucleic acids, and pathogen viability. The stability of some
animal viruses (e.g., foot-and-mouth disease virus) is markedly
affected by pH and ionic strength. One of the most commonly
used transport media is buffered tryptose broth. Buffered glyc-
erin, internationally used to transport vesicular disease speci-
mens, has been shown to preserve the causative virus at room
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temperature for long periods of time. This medium is not used
in the United States and has not been thoroughly tested for
PCR inhibition. Glycerol, at different concentrations, may in-
activate certain viruses while preserving others in clinical sam-
ples (25, 41, 42). A possible criterion for selecting an adequate
collection and transport medium for viruses of agricultural
concern could be the use of isotonic solutions with neutral
pH (23). Additional guidance for collection of virus specimens
can be found at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza
/guidelines/humanspecimens/en/.
The number and intricacies of the areas under consideration
emphasize the need for extensive training and knowledge to
allow flexibility in the development of sampling strategies that
are best suited for each set of circumstances.
PACKAGING, TRANSPORT, AND STORAGE
Obtaining an analytical result also can be affected by the
manner and conditions under which a specimen is transported
and stored. The same concerns discussed above with respect to
sample collection also apply to packaging and transportation.
Storage conditions differ for some microorganisms. For exam-
ple, anaerobes die when they are exposed to ambient levels of
oxygen during storage and therefore cannot be recovered upon
anaerobic culture (28). The packaging or storage conditions
required for a given microorganism also may differ depending
on the sample matrix or physical condition (e.g., liquid versus
powder). When there are copious quantities of microbial fo-
rensic evidence, some loss may be inconsequential, and various
packaging and storage strategies can be applied. However,
trace materials are very limited, and at times collection of only
one sample may be possible. In such scenarios, efforts to main-
tain the integrity of the sample are more demanding and crit-
ical. The packaging, transportation, and storage conditions
should be related to preserving the analyte or signature to be
analyzed.
Clinical medicine has well-developed packaging, transport,
and storage protocols (15, 16, 27, 37). Each specimen is trans-
ported in a package appropriate for the suspected microorgan-
ism and the type of specimen collected. Packaging for most
routine pathogens and the pathogens on the select agent list
(2) is defined, and the likely clinical specimens in which they
reside are known (11). Commercial products are available for
transporting clinical specimens. Transport packages designed
for most bacteria are not adequate if a viral etiology is sus-
pected. Specimens for culture should be transported to the
laboratory as promptly as possible. Transport strategies that
minimize damage, loss, contamination, or exposure to person-
nel are necessary (43). Some specimens can be transported at
room temperature, and some should be transported on ice (see
reference 44 for some recommended conditions). Most speci-
mens should be stored refrigerated to maintain viability, pre-
serve relative proportions, and minimize overgrowth of con-
taminants (blood is an important exception and should not be
refrigerated). Many commercial clinical laboratories have de-
veloped efficient and effective methods for defining transport
media and appropriate temperatures for particular classes of
microbes. The volumes of samples prescribed for analysis allow
for extra material, so evaluations can often be made when the
sample is “improperly” transported. Under certain circum-
stances, the collection of a specimen for microbial forensics is
more like the collection of a cerebrospinal fluid sample (14, 34)
or a surgical biopsy from a patient where it may be difficult or
impossible to obtain a second sample. Because it may be dif-
ficult to predict the optimal transport materials or process, a
variety of options should be made available to crime scene
investigators, and there should be consultation with experts,
when possible, prior to packaging.
For food or plant materials, the recommended packaging
and storage practices are similar to those used in clinical mi-
crobiology and have been well described (22). Sampling and
sample plans for foods are discussed in detail elsewhere (17).
Such methods depend on the nature of the food (e.g., whether
it is a solid, semisolid, or liquid; the storage conditions [i.e.,
whether it is frozen, refrigerated, or at ambient temperature],
and the type of packaging, if any, ensuring integrity of the food
product). To minimize amplification during transport or stor-
age, when possible, the sample should be maintained dry, fro-
zen, or at least chilled. However, some microorganisms may be
harmed if they are frozen. Buffered glycerol has been used to
minimize injury due to freezing and thawing (24). Methods
that do not cause significant decreases in the viabilities of
specific organisms improve typing success (30).
If an act of bioterrorism were perpetrated against agricul-
tural targets, sampling of crops and environmental materials
would be required. Samples of plant tissues or associated ma-
terials, such as insects, nematodes, soil, or water, should be
collected directly into a container with minimal contact. In the
field, plant tissues are usually placed dry into paper or plastic
bags and stored on ice until they can be refrigerated or pro-
cessed. In some cases, adding a small amount of sterile glycerol
to the plastic bag may delay tissue desiccation and preserve
pathogen signatures. Plastic sandwich box humidity chambers
can maintain humidity without directly wetting plant tissues or
insects. Masses of fungal hyphae or spores and bacterial ooze
have been collected from plant surfaces or soil into sealable
containers containing sterile water, a mild phosphate buffer
(3), or 70% ethanol depending on the type of analysis to be
performed. Some microorganisms (e.g., bacterial ring rot,
which can survive for 2 to 5 years in dried slime on equipment,
burlap sacks, etc.) can survive without stringent storage condi-
tions (32). Long-term storage of forensic microbial samples
prior to analysis is often necessary; however, long-term storage
conditions have not been well defined. Optimal storage condi-
tions (freezing versus refrigeration or lyophilization, humidity,
storage media) and sample longevities have been determined
for only a few plant pathogens.
While some of the practices described above apply in gen-
eral to collection of forensic samples, many times samples are
collected from the environment surrounding a crime scene. In
such cases, the state of the agent should be considered. For
example, cooling of dry material may produce condensation
that could alter its physical state and possibly interfere with
subsequent analysis. As a general practice, collected samples
are placed into sterile containers using dedicated sterile col-
lection tools. The samples are then placed into prelabeled
translucent ziplock bags for secondary containment and main-
tained at ambient temperature. A ziplock bag used as either
primary or secondary containment for contaminated physical
evidence may be contaminated during sample collection.
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Therefore, the exterior of sample containers should be decon-
taminated. The protocols for packaging and transporting sam-
ples to laboratories for analysis are based on federal regula-
tions designed to avoid inadvertent release of infectious
substances (12). However, for forensic analyses, maintaining
the integrity and authenticity of samples from the point of
collection is paramount, and following minimal transport reg-
ulations may not be adequate. There is a need to validate
transport and storage methods for as many agents and analytes
of concern as possible. In addition, because remaining evi-
dence should be made available to the defense for retesting, if
desired, proper long-term storage conditions have to be vali-
dated.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT
It is important to draw distinctions between investigations
designed to gather microbial forensic evidence and investiga-
tions designed to determine whether a pathogen is still present,
perhaps after a remediation effort. A recent GAO report pro-
vided recommendations concerned predominantly with reme-
diation. However, some important areas of overlap with evi-
dence collection for law enforcement purposes are instructive.
The GAO report (40) addressed and was consistent with many
of the issues discussed at the recent conference. The scientists
in attendance generally agreed with and supported the findings
of the GAO report in that validation of methods and processes
was deemed necessary to achieve best practices. However, the
conference attendees cautioned that the sampling strategy ad-
vocated by the authors of the GAO report for postremediation
analysis should not be extrapolated to, nor is it the best ap-
proach for, microbial forensic or initial public health and ag-
ricultural health investigations.
The GAO report was critical of the targeted sampling strat-
egy used to detect Bacillus anthracis in postal facilities in 2001.
In this instance, government agencies collected samples where,
in their best judgment, B. anthracis spores would most likely be
found. The GAO report suggested that the use of a random
and/or probability sampling strategy would allow determina-
tion of a level of statistical confidence for the absence of
building contamination in cases when all sampling results are
negative. As noted above, the report apparently pertains to
remediation and the decision of when to consider a building
safe for reoccupation. Whereas such verification sampling may
be necessary to confirm decontamination of a building (10), it
should not be confused with the different requirements of
microbial forensics.
FORENSIC SAMPLING STRATEGY
In clinical and agricultural diagnoses, sampling is prioritized
based on location, the type and extent of symptoms, prior
knowledge based on sound principles, and the materials avail-
able rather than randomly across the body of an infected in-
dividual, a field, or any location. Likewise, it would not be
productive for most forensic or clinical investigations to use a
randomized sample collection strategy. For example, if a pa-
tient presents with fever, difficulty with breathing, and a pro-
ductive cough but no headache or stiff neck, a physician would
likely obtain a sputum sample to search for a possible micro-
bial etiology rather than randomly gather samples that include
a lumbar puncture for cerebrospinal fluid or collect gastroin-
testinal samples to look for parasites. Similarly, fever, head-
ache, and a stiff neck would direct the physician to consider
meningitis as the diagnosis and target sampling to the cerebro-
spinal fluid to determine if an infection was present. For in-
vestigations involving plants, if necrotic lesions are present, it is
best to obtain samples from the lesion edges, where living plant
tissue supports active pathogen growth. Certain specialized
pathogen structures, such as the galls of smut fungi or the
tumors produced by the crown gall bacterium, may be collected
directly. In a food poisoning case, consumption of a food may
be epidemiologically associated with illness resulting from con-
tamination with a food-borne pathogen. To identify the micro-
organism, it would be more effective to collect samples from
the individuals who became ill than to collect samples from
randomly selected individuals in the population. In one exam-
ple of a food-borne outbreak that involved a targeted investi-
gation (and subsequent reexamination), strawberries were as-
sociated initially with development of illness in a number of
people. Although the cause was subsequently shown to be
Cyclospora cayetanensis, a gastrointestinal agent found in rasp-
berries from Guatemala (20), targeted sampling was clearly
advantageous in collecting the most informative samples. Sim-
ilarly, the presence of castor beans or bean mash at a crime
scene, or even access to internet records, would suggest the use
of directed sampling methods for the collection of suspected
ricin. Just as a clinical investigation or a food-borne illness
investigation should use the patient history, physical examina-
tion, and blood work to direct sampling, a forensic investiga-
tion should use available information to guide sampling. In
other words, procedures that would have the highest diagnostic
yield are given priority.
Certain factors can diminish the likelihood of a positive
finding with samples. Using food-borne contamination as an
example, these factors include increased time from contami-
nation to sampling, uneven dispersal of the pathogen in the
contaminated food, a very large volume of food to be sampled,
large batch size, short shelf life of the food, rapid turnaround
of implicated foods, and incorrect linkage between the food
and illness. These factors suggest that a sampling regimen
targeted to only the implicated food(s), its most probable
source(s), or the site(s) of origin for similar foods is the pre-
ferred sampling approach.
Despite the clear utility of targeted sampling in forensic (and
epidemiologic) investigations, statistically derived or random
sampling strategies may be useful sometimes. Although statis-
tically derived or random sampling strategies have not been
used routinely in the forensic sciences, it may be necessary in
some instances to understand sample-to-sample variability
when workers try to compare other factors across the environ-
ment. An application to forensics would be collecting back-
ground samples for determination of endemicity, when large
areas or quantities (e.g., shipments of a particular crop) need
to be sampled to look for a possible contaminant, or for sur-
veillance. In this respect, biogeographic considerations of
microbial pathogens also are important; the theories and em-
pirical observations regarding biogeography may provide im-
portant clues as to the endemicity or introduction of the spe-
cific pathogen identified during the investigation (26).
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The sampling strategy employed should take into account
the a priori knowledge about the crime scene, the science
available for characterizing the pathogen being sampled, the
different effects on recovery, the different surfaces that may
require specific sampling regimens, the microorganisms sam-
pled that might be viable but noncultivatable under the con-
ditions used for sampling, the possibility of different physio-
logical states of an organism (e.g., biofilm formation), and
other signatures (e.g., additives, stabilizers, morphology, and
isotopes) that may be forensically informative. If a bioterror-
ism event is suspected to have occurred within a building,
several scenarios may be plausible. The release point may be
easily traced to a specific container or visibly contaminated
small area. Alternatively, the exact location of the release may
be unknown, but there may be evidence (e.g., victims and
disturbed areas) that points to a general location. There may
also be cases requiring a comprehensive systematic sampling
strategy where the presence or absence of the agent or material
may be of investigative value. Finally, there may be little evi-
dence to indicate where the release, if any, may have occurred.
Under the first two scenarios, one would want to perform
targeted sampling near release points and on surfaces near the
release points where it is most probable that the biological
agent may have been deposited. Only in the last scenario might
some probabilistic sampling be prudent. Nevertheless, the ini-
tial sampling may still begin, for example, with the ventilation
system filters to determine if there was a release. Development
of a knowledge and information database would facilitate the
formulation of sampling strategies for different situations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
One of the goals of the DHS-sponsored Banbury meetings is
to identify the most pressing needs in microbial forensics so
that law enforcement, the NBFAC, and other scientific com-
munity assets can focus their efforts on closing identified ca-
pability gaps. For enhancing the tools available for sample
collection, handling, transport, and storage and for obtaining
maximal effectiveness in the application of investigative meth-
ods, the following recommendations are offered.
(i) Existing collection, storage, and transport protocols
should be housed and curated at a single site. Such a database
would allow a preliminary comparison of methods to deter-
mine which methods are sufficiently validated, what further
validation may be necessary, which methods are likely to suc-
ceed, and which methods are not effective. This would reduce
duplication of effort and allow scientists to build on previous
knowledge to improve processing and analytical methodolo-
gies. Moreover, an available knowledge database would facil-
itate development of the best operational plans. All current
methods, including those used by all federal agencies and those
described in the literature, should be placed into the database,
which should be accessible to appropriate entities. In addition
to the protocols, the data should include information on the
sample collection device, the type of agent (e.g., enveloped
virus, RNA virus, toxin, bacterium) or other forensically re-
lated material, what downstream analytical methods have been
used on the collected or recovered material (e.g., extraction
methods, live agent culture, PCR-based assay, elemental anal-
ysis), the storage conditions (e.g., room temperature, 4°C, fro-
zen at20°C,70°C), the transport conditions and media, the
interpretation guidelines, the long-term storage conditions,
and supporting validation data.
(ii) Protocols need to be validated with a broad spectrum of
bacterial species or strains, viruses, and toxins. There are many
protocols that have not been rigorously validated, and this lack
of evaluation limits the capabilities of crime scene investigators
to make the most effective decisions when they develop oper-
ational plans. In addition, subsequent interpretation of analyt-
ical results could be compromised without validation data.
Discipline-wide validation criteria should be developed. While
it is not possible to prescribe every possible tool or method
used to survey, capture, swab, assay, or otherwise detect patho-
gens that may be found at a crime scene, some general criteria
are needed to guide researchers and developers. These criteria
should include sensitivity, specificity, recovery efficiency, main-
tenance of integrity, impact on analytical assays, and baseline
disease and pathogen data.
(iii) Guidelines for collection of evidence at bioterrorism
and biocrime scenes should be established. The best approach
for searching a crime scene is the use of targeted strategies
grounded with established guidelines and experience. Certain
law enforcement personnel are trained specifically in the pro-
cesses of crime scene investigation. The guidelines used for
collecting and handling traditional forensic evidence should
form the baseline for microbial forensic investigations. Indeed,
the protocols developed by the Hazardous Material Response
Unit at the FBI are based on such practices. Therefore, the
crime scene investigation protocols of the FBI’s Hazardous
Material Response Unit should become the initial de facto
national guidelines. The principles and guidelines should be
made available to other appropriate organizations, so that they
can benefit from previous experience; also, this could facilitate
comparisons of information collected by different agencies. In
addition, availability fosters peer review and leads to rigorous
evaluation and thus could improve the current guidelines. The
ultimate success of recovering evidence during a crime scene
investigation is dependent on an understanding of the type(s)
of organisms (fungi, bacteria, viruses, or other parasites) or
other organic and nonorganic materials that might be present.
Knowledge of the most effective tools for collection and recov-
ery and of the best storage conditions is essential for improving
the formulation of an operational plan, facilitating identifica-
tion of the types of effective signatures, and minimizing the
impact of potential inhibitors. Empirical data on validation
studies should also exemplify scenarios to illustrate why and
how collection tools and methods have to differ depending on
the downstream methods used for detection and pathogen
identification. Knowledge of what public health workers have
already developed with respect to outbreak investigations
would also be helpful for investigations, particularly those in-
volving food.
(iv) Finally, there is a need for training (12). Hazardous
material response crime scene investigators responding to
known crime scenes are likely trained in proper practices.
However, there will be cases where law enforcement or med-
ical examiners may be responding to a more traditional crime
and unknowingly enter a scene where a biological agent has
been involved or is being prepared. These investigators may
not be aware that the scene is hazardous or that there are
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signatures indicative of bioweapon preparation or production.
Necessary training should be made available so investigators
are more cognizant of the indications of the presence of suspected
microbial biohazards (e.g., sophisticated equipment, egg incuba-
tors, yogurt makers, beer-brewing equipment, bleach, pressure
cooker, petri dishes, flasks, pH paper, improvised fermenters,
mills, PPEs, sprayers).
First responders at a crime scene are likely to be local per-
sonnel or public health personnel and not necessarily individ-
uals affiliated directly with law enforcement. In most cases,
their top priorities are the health of victims, limiting disease
spread and damage, and public security rather than preserva-
tion of a potential crime scene and evidence collection. Making
these first responders cognizant, or better yet appropriately
training them, would be beneficial to maintaining operator
safety and preserving evidence that may otherwise be lost.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the October 2005 DHS Banbury meeting
was to identify gaps and make recommendations regarding
sample collection, handling, and preservation of microbial fo-
rensic evidence. We report the nature of these discussions to
inform the greater scientific community of ongoing directions
in the field of microbial forensics. The microbial forensic in-
vestigation, its success, and its impact are dependent upon the
initial phases of a crime scene investigation, which rely heavily
on the collection, handling, and preservation of physical evi-
dence. If these procedures are not developed as well as possi-
ble, the entire process is weakened. We stress that efforts
should be intensified in the areas described here to ensure
capability for robust development, validation, use, and reliabil-
ity of microbial forensics to support the attribution of crimes
involving the use of biological weapons. Additional or alter-
nate viewpoints intended to bolster these research and devel-
opment plans and, most importantly, to contribute to the clos-
ing of gaps that can enhance capabilities of achieving
attribution in acts of bioterrorism or crimes are welcome.
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